In response to “Moral Realism is a Mirrage” by E.J.
In order to assert “[t]here is no metaphysical directive from nature that [such and such] is wrong,” the proponent must accept three things:
(1) that we have a satisfactorily complete understanding of nature;
(2) that a realist necessarily must accept good as a product of nature; and
(3) that good is a directive.
Whether we have a satisfactorily complete understanding of nature
While we have undoubtedly made remarkable strides in biology, chemistry, and physics, the depth and breadth of our understanding of nature is more like a crack than a canyon. Nature has proven to be enigmatic, hiding foundational physical elements behind the veil of Isis (please note that Isis here is referring to the goddess of nature).1 e.g. a majority of mainstream physicists agree that gluons and quarks, the particles responsible for the strong force in physics, are forever obscured from visual observation in what is called the confinement phase. That means that something that we experience and is responsible for how our universe functions can never be visualized. Science acknowledges the possibility that information itself may be a foundational element of space and time.2 Wheeler, John. “It from a Bit.” Why then are we so opposed to the idea that good is fundamental too?
Whether a realist must accept good as a product of nature
It is possible that good does not come from nature but instead is sui generis.3 Sui generis is a philosophical term of art meaning: It might be a non-natural realm that is neither theological nor natural, but sui generis, i.e., unique. Thus even if we are able to define all the interactions underlying the physical universe, there is no reason to believe we will have any greater understanding of metaphysical phenomena than we do today. With respect to the metaphysical phenomenon of consciousness, Dr. David Chalmers claims that even if we can pinpoint all the areas of the brain activated by an experience and can completely explain the function of all the physical properties that are responsible for experience, we still will not be able to say why experience is subjective instead of objective. Dr. Chalmers refers to this as the hard problem of consciousness.
There is no reason to believe that goodness is substantively different than consciousness in this regard.
Whether there is objective moral truth comes down to the belief of whether moral good is invented or discovered. I land on the side of good being discovered. In this sense, I compare good to logic and time. Like physical time and metaphysical logic, I believe good existed before man first conceptualized it. Just like time or logic, good’s existence does not depend on man’s ability to perceive it to exist.
For this reason, the line of criticism arising from how nature accounts for good is immaterial to good’s validity, i.e., the fact that living creatures do not perceive actions as good or not good has no bearing on whether good exists. Until the late 17th century and 18th century, no creature on earth remotely understood the nature of time, yet it does not follow that Newton then invented time–he discovered it. Even still, it was not until Einstein, some 200 years later, that our understanding of the nature of time began to reflect its true essence more accurately. So again, it was not as if relative time sprung into existence when Einstein conceptualized the idea–it existed even while unrecognized.
Whether “good” is a directive
Under my conception of good, there is no directive from nature or some other source to be good. So in this sense, I may have to revise my claim to be a moral realist if what follows is contradictory to moral realism. Good is tautological in that good is good. Good is difficult to define with words, but that does not mean it is undefinable. Instead, the words we have may be inadequately suited for the role. As Learned Hand wrote on the subject, “[t]he bane of philosophy has been that it must speak in the words of creatures who have worked their way out from the grunts and cries that accompanied their responses to their environment, and these all carry emotional obligatos that destroy them for thinking purposes.”
Ethics is the vehicle for one to be good. And ethics is undoubtedly invented by man not discovered. Good serves as the authority for ethics; without good ethics is rudderless.
Both anti-realism subcategories–relativism and constructivism–run into the same issue 4 despite the constructivist’s objections to the contrary: they lack the foundational authority to condemn poor behavior. When distilled down, the statement “[t]here is only a social consensus that [such and such] is wrong. That social consensus is a product of various other moral and ideological commitments, such as respect for individual autonomy and personal dignity” has no authoritative substance, as this focus puts the em · PHA · sis on the wrong syl · LA · ble. A consensus is regional and fickle and bears no authoritative weight when condemning an objectively amoral act. The consensus that we ought to do good is the directive, rather than the foundational underpinning of what is good or not good.