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EuMythyphro Dilemma

When I sat down to write this essay, I intended to reason through a question that has troubled me for years.

My undergraduate ethics class was eye-opening because it was my first intellectually strenuous experience. Before that class, I knew nothing substantive about relativism, utilitarianism, Kant, or philosophical challenges to my Christian faith. Of all the ethical perspectives, dilemmas, and esoteric ideas covered, the Euthyphro Dilemma has continued to vex me to this day.

The modern iteration of the Euthyphro Dilemma is inspired by one of Socrates’s dialogues. Bertrand Russel then modified it to apply to the Judao-Christian conception of God.

There are two traditionally recognized “horns” to this question: (1) Something is right because God commands it—implying that God solely decides what is good, and (2) God commands it because it is right—implying that “The Good” is independent of God. As with all dilemmas, both horns have distressing implications for a believer in God’s authority.

Horn One: If something is good because God says so, then what is good is arbitrary.

Horn Two: If goodness is independent of God, then God is less than omnipotent because He does not have authority over The Good.

I quickly understood my thoughts on God’s relationship with morality and “The Good” was not as simple as my younger, more naive self believed.

Eventually, I settled for the first horn of the dilemma. I was comfortable with good being arbitrary because God, through His position as the creator of all, has the license to determine what was suitable for His creation.1 My thoughts on Horn One are similar to my thoughts on how to pronounce .gif correctly. If Stephen Wilhite, the creator of the .gif, pronounces the acronym for Graphics Interface Format with a “soft g” like the peanut butter brand, no linguist will convince me that it should be pronounced with a “hard g.” Moreover, as a practical matter, the arbitrariness of goodness was inconsequential because good being arbitrary is ultimately unimportant if the arbiter of good always behaves in a manner consistent with humanity’s best conceptions of good and evil.

I held this position until I attempted to come to terms with the story of Job. In summary, I did not see God’s inherent goodness in the trial God authorized Job to endure at the hands of Satan, and it became apparent that I would need to revisit the dilemma.

I set out to write a different essay about the troubling implications of Horn Two. However, while researching for this article, I came across an intriguing confounding answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma that Christian theologians Greg Koukl and Dr. William Lane Craig espouse:

The third option is that an objective standard exists (this avoids the first horn of the dilemma). However, the standard is not external to God, but internal (avoiding the second horn). Morality is grounded in the immutable character of God, who is perfectly good. His commands are not whims, but rooted in His holiness."

Excerpt from Who Says God is Good?

Dr. William Lane Craig, addressing the same subject, explains further:

"It's not the case that God wills something because it is good, nor is it the case that something is good just because God wills it. Rather, God wills something because He is good. That is to say, it is God's own nature which determines what is 'The Good.'"

Excerpt from What is the Euthyphro Dilemma?

There are two significant problems with this attempt to work around the Euthyphro Dilemma: 

(1) their argument is not just incoherent but specious as well; and

(2) their argument merely tries to defeat the dilemma by showing a third possibility without considering the implications of their “third horn.”

The third horn is frankly absurd. Rather than present state something of substance, Koukl, Craig, et al. contorted portions of the two traditional horns in an unsuccessful attempt to retain the desirable pieces and discard the bad. However, in so doing, they create a Frankenstein-like horn that does not solve anything and instead adds new and more confounding problems.

Imagine the following conversation:

Q: Is God always good?

A: Yes, God is always good.

Q: How do you know that God is always good?

A: Because goodness is the essence of God–the nature of God is The Good.

Q: Is it fair to say that if God does it, it is good?

A: Yes, it is inconceivable for God to do anything that is not good, for that would be impossible since God is good.

For the proponents of Horn Three, the last answer is necessary and troubling.  

If goodness is defined by His nature and it is only possible for God to do good, He lacks agency because His actions are limited, as God’s actions are bound by goodness. However, if God has complete agency and can do whatever He wants, but those actions are nevertheless good, then good is arbitrary.

An all-powerful being must possess agency to be all-powerful and supreme. Moreover, God’s lack of agency is a much more forceful criticism than goodness being independent of Him. Therefore, for Christians to sincerely believe God is the ultimate authority and has a perfect plan, they must believe He has agency. 

Assuming arguendo that Horn Three is a valid third option, the Koukl, Craig, et al. argument faces a greater problem still. 

If we accept the premise that God’s nature is “The Good,” we are presented with a new paradox. If God is all good and all of creation is a manifestation of God, then all of God’s creation is necessarily good, and there is no room for evil. 

1. In the beginning, there was nothing but God, and everything is manifested from Him.

2. Because God’s essence and nature are The Good, God, by definition, must be incorruptible in every aspect of His being.

Therefore, the same incorruptible material comprises all creation.

Imagine the following manufacturing plant. The materials, equipment, and designs are perfect. When all aspects of the manufacturing process are perfect, everything produced by the plant must be perfect. Therefore, the only way for the facility to create anything less than an ideal must be a conscious decision to make something imperfectly. However, if Horn Three is applied to God and His creation, God wouldn’t even be able to conceive of evil, much less make the conscious decision to create evil.

The Gospel of Matthew 7:15-20, “15 Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. 16 By their fruit you will recognize them. Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles? 17 Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit. 18 A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit. 19 Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. 20 Thus, by their fruit you will recognize them.”

Is it impossible to reconcile this passage with the third horn espoused by Craig, Koukl, et al. Yet, empirically, we know this is not the case. Evil abounds in this world, and the Bible doesn’t avoid this fact. Sin is everywhere in the Bible, and at times, corruption is so pervasive that God says He regrets His creation and even elects to cull variously sized portions of the population. This does not jive with the Koukl, Craig, et al. “solution” to the Euthyphro Dilemma.

By merely attempting to defeat one problem, Dr. Craig and Koukl stumble upon a legion of new ones.

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